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CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
European Views on Its Conception and Its Future
Joseph Y. Dautricourt
The author is Judge in Brussels and deputy-president of the Military Tribunal
for the trial of German war criminals.
He has written books and articles on punishment of traitors and collaborators,
during the German occupation in his country.
He is now director of the Revue de Droit Penal &" de Criminologie and was
rapporteur general on the Definition of Crime against Humanity at the VIIth
Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, held at Brussels, July 10 and 11, 1947.

I
In its judgment, rendered on December 22, 1947, in the case
of Friedrich Flick et al., count 3, the U.S.A. Military Tribunal
of Nurnberg, court 4, quotes the definition of crime against
humanity, formulated by the VIIIth Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, to support its own restrictive conception
of the crime. We cannot approve the Tribunal's interpretation.
We believe the court was not exactly informed as to the aim, the
meaning and the extent of that definition.
In order to make our position clear, we briefly summarize the
case. The defendant Flick was charged with crime against
humanity because, previously to the war, he acquired through
sales, some of the industrial property owned by Jews, who were
expropriated by general governmental decree, dated December
3, 1938.
The Court states first that the fact-if a crime-is not a warcrime, because it was committed before the war and wholly
unconnected with the war. It thus makes a finding of lack of
jurisdiction, based not only on Law 10 of December 20, 1945, but
also on the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, and the
London Agreement of August 8, which constitute, taken together, its chartering legislation.
And the Court adds: "Under these circumstances, we make
the following statements on the merits relating to this count,
(crime against humanity) with full appreciation that statements
as to the merits are pure dicta where a finding of lack of jurisdiction is also made." Introduced in this way, the discussion is
purely theoretical and cannot have the slightest influence on the
authority of the sentence.
The question was to know whether deprivation of property on
racial grounds was a crime against humanity. The answer of
the Court is "no": "We believe that the proof does not establish a crime against humanity, recognized as such by the Law
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of Nations, when defendants were engaged in the property
transactions here under scrutiny."
We cannot but agree with the Court. When the accused acted,
unlawful deprivation of property, on racial or religious grounds,
was not a crime against humanity because-prior" to the Charter-no Law of nations did qualify it as such-nor did it qualify
any deed as such.
To support its opinion, the Tribunal quotes an article: "The
Judgment of Nurnberg and the Principle of Legality of Offenses
and Penalties" by Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, the eminent
penalist and French member of the I.M.T., in which he expresses the view that: "The theory of crimes against humanity
is dangerous; dangerous for the peoples by the absence of precise definition; dangerous for the States because it offers a pretext to intervention by a State, in the internal affairs of weaker
States."I
And, indeed, in the trial of the major war-criminals, crimes
against humanity were held to have been committed "only when2
the proof also fully established the commission of war crimes."1
II

But the Court also quotes the definition adopted by the VIllth
Conference, and, there, it was obviously misinformed.
In fact, the definition quoted by the Court is but an excerpt of
the resolution adopted by the Conference which was never published, but as a whole3 and which ought to be interpreted as such.
Here is the translation of that resolution in its integral, original text:
1

Whereas, on the one hand, respect of the rights and the dignity of
the human person is the very foundation of civilization;
Whereas protection of those rights and that dignity against any unlawful infringement has been progressively organized in the internal
legislations which punish those infringements as offenses;
Whereas a tribute must be paid to the national legislators who endeavoured to secure that protection by the provisions of the positive law
or by national drafts;
lRevue de Droit p6nal 4 de Criminologie, Brussels 1946-47, p. 813.
2Biddle, Judge Francis: The Niirnberg Trial-Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society-vol. 91, No. 3, August, 1947, p. 301.
3 Huitiame Confdrence internationae pour l'Unification du Dro2 p6rnal-Actes
de la Conferenme-Paris, Pedone 1949, p. 227 and also: Rev. Dr. pen. & Crim.
Brussels 1947-48, p. 83; Bevve de Drart international de Sciences diplomatiques 4
politiques (Sottile) Genave 1947, p. 273.
The U.S.A. Military Tribunal could not have access to the acts which were only
published in November 1948; but from the quotation of definitions proposed by
Mr. Aroneanu and Pfr. Lyra (Brazil) we infer that the Court examined our general
report which was published: Rev. Dr. p6n. & Crim. Brussels 1947-48, p. 47 and
Rev. Dr. intern. (Sottile) 1947, p. 294-Acts, p. 47.
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Whereas, owing to the general evolution of Law and of the social
relation and to the nature of those offenses, it is not only desirable but
necessary that this protection should be organized on an international
scale;
Whereas it is especially necessary to protect against any offense the
cause of which is race, nationality, religion or opinions, the rights of
man of which protection is granted by the internal law or which, for
the future, will be determined by the competent international bodies;

2
Whereas, on the other hand, until a law is passed which will punish
as an offense against humanity any infringement of the fundamental
rights of man, especially the rights to life, health, corporal integrity
and freedom, it is necessary to yield to the imperative wish of the
universal conscience, to secure, from this very moment, the repression of
manslaughter and any deed the result of which is subversion of human
life, either committed against individuals, against human groups, because of their race, their nationality, their religion or their opinions;
Whereas the repression ought to be organized on an international scale
and secured by an international Tribunal, when the accused are rulers,
agents or protegees of the State and also in the absence of repression by
the internal repressive law;
The EIGHTH CONFERENCE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
PENAL LAW:
RECOMMENDS:
establishment as an offense sui generis against common law and inclusion in the international penal Code and in all the internal repressive
Codes, from this moment and at the least, of a provision to punish
the deeds related to in the following text:
Any manslaughter, or act which can bring about death, committed in
peace time as in war time, against individuals or groups of individuals,
because of their race, nationality, religion or opinions, constitutes a
crime against humanity and must be punished as murder. (Italics ours.)
The Conference Expresses the Wish:
That the States should punish propaganda aiming at commission of
crimes against humanity.

I
When the U.S.A. Military Tribunal, in its opinion, limits the
quotation to the definition which we emphasized and adds: "But
from the report of the proceedings, this seems to have been the
extent of agreement," it makes an obvious error, because agreement was reached not only on the definition but on the resolution
as a whole.
And indeed, the preamble cannot be separated from the definition. Both were discussed at once. Drafted by a small committee, of which the author was a member, to express the views
of a large majority in the second symposium, it was successively
adopted by the symposium itself and by the general assembly,
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debate, the report of which is to be found in
after a thorough
4
the Acts.

. Even taken alone, the definition has no restrictive sense whatsoever, because it is not a definition of the crime against humanity, but of a crime against humanity. Genocide is also a
crime against humanity and the wickedest of all, but who could
assert that a definition of genocide could be restrictive, with
regard to the conception of crime against humanity?
From the preamble and from the discussion, it is clear beyond
any doubt, that the limiting definition, the advocates of which
were Mr. Boissarie, Pfr. Pella and Pfr. Rollin, president of
the Belgian senate, was passed but a minimo and based only on
opportunity and sense of possibility. The definition could support and broaden altogether the bill on genocide which was, at
the time, to be put to the general assembly of the U.N.O.
It is clear also that a large majority of the Conference supported a much broader conception, which is to be found in the
first sentence of the second part of the preamble. Crime against
humanity is "any infringement of the fundamental rights of
man, committed against individuals, or against groups of individuals, because of their race, their nationality, or their opinions." And referring to the second sentence, we may add:
"by abuse of the sovereign authority of the State."
The reports for the Holy See (Pfr. Bondue), for Luxemburg
(quoting Mr. Aroneanu), for Poland (Air. Sawicki), for France
(Mr. Herzog), for Switzerland (Pfr. Graven), for the Netherlands (Pfr. Pompe and Mr. Kazemier) and the general report
itself were much in favor of a broad conception of the crime and
the statements of these jurists, during the debate, cannot but
reinforce that conclusion.
We must confess that, at the time, the aforesaid definition
was but of slight value because of the absence of an effective
universal declaration of human rights. But since the international bill of the rights of man was passed by the general assembly of the U.N.O., at Paris, in the night of December 10, 1948,
an important step was made toward an inclusive and adequate
definition of the crime against humanity. And indeed, there is
between human rights and crime against humanity a direct
bond already emphasized by most of the members of the VI~th
Conference, the full extent of which jurists may now realize
and formulate.
The right to property being recognized by Article 17 of the
4 Acts, p. 208.
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Bill, is it still true that arbitrary deprivation of property by
the State on racial grounds, is not a crime against humanity?
Moreover, the views of the judges of the U.S.A. Military
Tribunal and those of the members of the VIIIth Conference
were quite different. The Military Tribunal could not sentence
beyond its chartering legislation, nor even, in the expression of
its own theoretical conception of crime against humanity, base
its opinion on other grounds than the provisions of the Law of
Nations, at the time when the defendants acted.
On the other hand, the definition aimed at by the VIfIth Conference was to secure a foundation for the future "codification of the offenses against the peace and security of mankind,
to which President Truman invited the best jurists in the world
to cooperate and which he entitled 'an enormous task.' "5
The jurist who, in Europe, has most contributed to the study
of crime against humanity is Mr. Eugene Aroneanu. 6 He, too,
was a member of the VIIIth Conference and took part in the
debate on the resolution.
His belief is that crime against humanity is the international
crime. Not only genocide, but even war of aggression and war
crimes stricto sensu are but species of crime against humanity
because they, too, involve first, a mischievous infringement of
the fundamental and imprescriptible rights of numerous human beings, not because of themselves, as in the internal repressive law, but because of their nationality and also an abuse of
the sovereign power of the State.
We also emphasize that in its very conception, and also in
the definition by the VIIIth Conference, which are both free of
the rather artificial bounds given to the conception by the Charter and by the judgment of the I.M.T., crime against humanity
may be "committed in peace time as in war time."
The juridical conception of crime against humanity is a new
one and its future cannot be restrained within arbitrary bounds,
based on its application by military tribunals whose jurisdiction was strictly confined to crimes committed during the war
or in connection with the war.
Although dangerous before it was clearly defined, the conception of crime against humanity may soon prove itself to be
the key of universal penal law.
5 His letter to acknowledge the reception of Judge Francis Biddle's report on the
Niirnberg trial, dated November 12, 1946.
6 Donnedieu de Vabres Henry: Le Jgement de Nuremberg et le principe de
L6galit des D6lits et des Peines-Rev. Dr. PWn. 4 Grim. Brussels 1946-47, p. 823.
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IV.
What is universal penal law? It is the whole of provisions

which protect the universal public order, by definition and repression of the offenses againstthat order7
But why not "international penal law?"
We believe that even with reference to the principles of the
Charter and "a fortiori" with reference to the law of the
future, "international" is both inadequate and ambiguous, thus
unfit for scientific purposes.
Inadequate, because neither the law of Nurnberg, nor the
penal law of Nations which we are groping for, are basically
grounded on agreement between States, on treaties or conventions but on the imperatives of the universal conscience, an
authentic interpreter of which may be an assembly of representatives of the States, if only, the governments of those States
are freely elected, in a country where freedom of opinion and
election is granted.
Ambiguous because the name of "international penal law"
was already given by Pfr. Donnedieu de Vabres to a quite different branch of repressive law, namely: "the science which determines the competency of the repressive courts of the State with
respect to the foreign jurisdictions, the application of its criminal laws in relation with the places and the persons whom they
rule, the authority on its territory, of foreign repressive sentences." 8
With reference to the appellation of that new branch of laws,
Pfr. Pella, who may be considered as its pioneer, gave up the
epithet: interitatique-(interstatic), and proposed "supranational,"9 which may be adequate but sounds also rather artificial.
We believe that a "universal penal law" expresses better than
any.other expression that this law, the source of which is to be
found in the deepest conscience of men and which is intended
to protect the universal public order against its worst evils:
crime against humanity and war, is not only superior to the
State and its internal laws, but also, binds all the States and
Nations on earth; each man individually, each group of men
and mankind as a whole.
7 Dautricourt Joseph Y.: Le Drait p.nal dans 'Ordre public universel, Revue de
Sciences crinminelles, Paris 1948, p. 481 and Inleiding tot het positief Wereldstrafrecht-Tijdschrift Voor Strafrecht, Leiden (Netherlands) 1948 XXI. Deel LVII,
Afi. 3-4, p. 293.
8 Donnedieu de Vabres H.: Introductio a VlEtude du Droit p6nal internationa7Paris, Sirey, 1922, p. 6.
9 Pella Pfr. Vespasian V.: Fonctons pacaifwcatrices du Droit p6nal supranational
et Fin du SystSme traditionnel des Traits de Paiz-Communication a Z'Acadfmie
des Sciences inorales et politiques de P'Institut de France (February 17, 1947)Paris, P done 1947, p. 15.

